

mony which subsisted between the Courts of Great Britain and France, it seems unnecessary, in a history of their political conduct, to say any thing further on the subject. But an eminent writer has endeavoured to excite a suspicion, that, beside the avowed object of suppressing sedition, the proclamation had a *secret* tendency, and that "at this time" the seeds of war were sown, which we "have ever since been unfortunately reaping." I request, therefore, every impartial man, to re-consider the conduct of the British Government toward France, as described in the preceding chapters of this work: I request him to recollect the absolute refusal to join the coalition, to remember the strict regard paid to the principles of neutrality, in the rejection of the advantageous offer made by the colonists of St. Domingo, to take a review of the general conduct of Administration, from the opening of Parliament on the 31st of January,

1792, to its prorogation on the 15th of June, and then seriously ask himself, whether it could be the design of the British Government in May, 1792, to engage in a war with France. At that time Mr. Pitt's favourite object was a diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, the promotion of commerce, and of general welfare throughout the kingdom, the attainment of which would necessarily be impeded by the expences of a foreign war. Is it possible that a Minister could, at one instant, speak with enthusiasm of the advantages, which he proposed to obtain for his country, and yet resolve at the next instant to sacrifice all these advantages without any reason? Whoever can admit this supposition must possess a faith, which bids defiance to all the rules of probability. Why then is it conjectured, that it was Pitt's design, in May, 1792, to involve England in a war with France? Because a Royal Proclamation was
issued

issued on the 21st of this month, against seditious writings! It is inferred, therefore, that because a Government takes measures to preserve *peace at home*, it has formed a resolution to engage in *a war abroad*! But if the inference be really valid, it operates much more forcibly against the other party, and proves that the National Assembly had, long before the period in question, resolved on a war with England: for every decree, which had been made against the French royalists, affords just as good a proof of an hostile disposition toward England, as a proclamation against English democrats of an hostile disposition toward France. That the British Cabinet, however, was far from entertaining any sentiments of hostility toward France, when this proclamation was issued, is a fact, which has been admitted not only by the old, but even by the *new* Government of that country. Mr. Chauvelin, in his note of the 18th of June, which was written

nearly a month after the appearance of the proclamation, declared, that he had received orders from his Court, to thank his Britannic Majesty *for his friendly dispositions, his sentiments of humanity, of justice, and of peace*:(10) and when Lord Gower quitted Paris, after the King was dethroned, he received a note from Le Brun, in the name of the Executive Council, containing the following declaration, "The French Nation has reason to hope, that the British Cabinet will not depart, at this critical moment, from *that justice, that moderation, and that impartiality which it has hitherto displayed*."(11) Mr. Chauvelin himself, likewise, in a letter sent to his own Government on the 17th of

(10) See the preceding chapter, note 9.

(11) "La Nation Française a lieu d'espérer que le Cabinet Britannique ne se départira point, en ce moment décisif, *de la justice, de la modération, et de l'impartialité, qu'il a montré jusqu'à présent*." Moniteur 26th August, 1792.

July, (12) bore ample testimony to the friendly dispositions of the British Court. When the advocates of the French therefore contend, that Government endeavoured in May, 1792, to promote a war with France, they assert what their clients themselves deny. In fact, there is no connexion what soever between the premises and the conclusion, unless certain intermediate ideas be introduced, which will hardly occur to any man, who is a real lover of his country. That they who wish to overturn the British Constitution have considered the cause of the French as their own, and have regarded, therefore, the proclamation of the 21st of May, which was certainly inimical to *them*, as inimical likewise to France, is very possible. But then they must not give too great a latitude to their conclusion: by the word

(12) This letter, which is printed in the *Moniteur*, 29th July, 1792, will be quoted at length in the eighth chapter.

“France” they must not understand the French Government, and still less the French nation at large: for the Jacobins, though their influence was very great, had not brought matters so far in May, 1792, that they could be considered at that time, as constituting either the French Government, or the representation of the whole body of the people. The utmost, therefore, that can be inferred, by help of this association of ideas, is, that the proclamation was inimical to a certain society in Paris. Now this society had either entered into the views of those persons, against whom the proclamation was levelled, or it had not. In the latter case, the general expression “sundry persons in foreign parts,” could no more affect the Jacobins, than any other society in Europe. In the former case, they had still less cause for complaint, since he, who makes the first attack, can have no reason to take it ill, if his adversary defends himself. And
in

in this latter case, which admits of no doubt, (13) those writers who endeavour to throw the blame of the present war on the British Government, will defeat their own purpose, if they consider the term "Jacobin Club" as synonymous with France at large: but if this synonymity be rejected, all *appearance* of foundation for the inference, that the proclamation was inimical to France, is removed.

(13) See note 3.

CHAP. VII.

Prorogation of the British Parliament on the 15th of June. Speech from the Throne. Chauvelin's Note of the 18th of June, requesting the Mediation of Great Britain. Answer of the British Cabinet. Reflections on this Subject.

ON the 15th of June, the British Parliament, after a session replete with measures, which indicated the expectation of continued peace, was prorogued with a speech from the throne, (1) in which his Majesty, after expressing his satisfaction at the steps which had been taken for the di-

(1) Annual Register, 1792, State Papers, p. 196: or New Annual Register, Public Papers, p. 58.

minution of the public burthens, and the reduction of the national debt, proceeded as follows: "I have seen with great concern
 " the commencement of hostilities in different parts of Europe. In the present
 " situation of affairs, it will be my principal
 " care to maintain that harmony and good
 " understanding which subsists between me
 " and the several Belligerent Powers, and to
 " preserve to my people the uninterrupted
 " blessings of peace. And the assurances
 " which I receive from all quarters, of a
 " friendly disposition toward this country,
 " afford me the pleasing hope of succeeding
 " in these endeavours."

Within three days, however, after the prorogation of Parliament, a proposal was made on the part of France, which, had it been accepted, would have effectually disturbed the repose then enjoyed by Great Britain, namely: On the 18th of June,

Mr. Chauvelin communicated a Note to Lord Grenville, (2) in which the mediation of the British Cabinet was requested between France and the allied powers of Austria and Prussia. In this Note, after an introduction, expressive of the friendly conduct of Great Britain on the one hand, (3) and the danger which threatened France from the two great Continental Powers on the other, the interposition of the former was requested on the following grounds, and in the following words: "The consequences of such a conspiracy, formed by the concurrence of powers who have been so long rivals, will be easily felt by his Britannic Majesty: the balance of Europe, the independence of the different powers,

(2) The French original is printed in the *Moniteur*, 20th July, 1792, under the title *Copie de la Note adressée à Milord Grenville par M. Chauvelin, du 18 Juin, 1792.* An English translation of it is in the *Annual Register*, 1792, *State Papers*, p. 262.

(3) See above, chap. v. note 9.

" the

“ the general peace, every consideration,
 “ which at all times has fixed the attention
 “ of the English Government, is at once
 “ exposed and threatened. The King of the
 “ French presents these serious and import-
 “ ant considerations to the solicitude and
 “ the friendship of his Britannic Majesty:
 “ Strongly penetrated with the marks of
 “ interest and of affection which he has re-
 “ ceived from him, he invites him to seek
 “ in his wisdom, in his situation, and in his
 “ influence, means compatible with the in-
 “ dependence of the French Nation, to stop,
 “ while it is still time, the confederacy, &c.”
 “ His Majesty has thought, that in the ex-

To this proposal, which involved the in-
 terests and the tranquillity of Great Britain,
 was returned, on the 8th of July, after ma-
 ture deliberation, the following answer. (4)

(4) The French original is printed in the *Moniteur*,
 20th July, 1792, and an English translation in the *An-
 nual Register*, immediately after M. Chauvelin's note.

“isting circumstances of the war now be-
“gun, the intervention of his councils, or
“of his good offices, cannot be of use, *un-*
“*less they should be desired by all the parties*
“*interested.*”

The refusal of the British Cabinet to interpose between France and the other Belligerent Powers, unless those powers likewise desired its mediation, was certainly the most prudent conduct which could have been adopted. Yet this prudent conduct has been the subject of severe reprehension; and Ministers have been censured, for not standing forward as the champions of France. Had France then so strong a claim on the gratitude of Great Britain, as to be entitled to expect that we should involve ourselves in a war merely on her account? For every one knows, that a mediation, unsupported by an armament, must be wholly ineffectual; and Mr. Chauvelin himself had very
clearly

clearly suggested, that the requested mediation was to consist, not in bare solicitations, but in effectual and decisive measures. Let us ask, then, For whom was England to take these effectual and decisive measures? For whom was England to engage in a continental war? For whom was England to sacrifice those advantages which were then the favourite objects of Government, and which could not be preserved without a continuance of peace? For a nation, which has never ceased to be our mortal enemy: for a nation, which has embraced every opportunity of humbling its neighbour, which never saw the British Government in distress without taking ungenerous advantage of it, and at the beginning of the very last war, which was concluded hardly ten years before the period in question, had proved itself as treacherous as hostile! Strange, therefore, was the request of France; and still more strange the censure of British subjects, because

because it was refused. This censure ill becomes those who accuse Ministers of being the authors of the war, which broke out in the following year, unless the case of commencing hostilities *in favour* of France is to be excepted from the general animadversion.

The requested mediation has been termed indeed an act of peace, and the non-acceptance of it has been represented as indicating a disposition to hostilities. But since this pretended act of peace would have previously involved us in a war, before any effect could have been produced, we may rather conclude, that the same principle of neutrality, and the same desire to avoid hostilities in general, which had induced the British Cabinet to refuse to join the adversaries of France, occasioned likewise the resolution to take no part against them. And as to the supposed hostile disposition toward France, at the time when the answer of the British Cabinet was given, it is completely contradicted

contradicted by the avowal of the French themselves, by Mr. Chauvelin's letter to his own Government of the 17th of July, and by Le Brun's note to Lord Gower on his departure from Paris in the month of August. (5)

Suppose, however, that the British Government had accepted the proffered mediation, and, what must necessarily have taken place, unless the mediation was to consist in mere words, had resolved to join France, if the other parties refused to accept it, the resolution, though highly detrimental to ourselves, would have rendered very little service to those who required it. The danger which at that time threatened France, proceeded not from any maritime power, but from the two great continental powers, Austria and Prussia, in comparison of whose

(5) See the latter part of the preceding chapter.

armies, that of Great Britain in the year 1792, at least in point of number, was a mere nothing. A mediation therefore could have produced no effect, unless these two powers *voluntarily* consented to it: and for this very reason, the answer of the British Cabinet was the most proper which could be given. The case would have been totally different, if France had been engaged in a war at sea, since Great Britain, with its formidable fleet, would then have possessed the means of obliging the adversaries of France to accept its mediation. But even in this case, it would have been imprudent to have incurred the expences of a naval armament: for the experiment had been already made, when we attempted a mediation between Russia and the Porte, and had met with sufficient opposition to dissuade Ministers from making a second attempt of the same kind, within so short a period after the first.

I have

I have hitherto argued on the supposition, that the French Government really wished for the re-establishment of peace. That the King of France himself sincerely wished it, may be readily granted: but on the 8th of July, when the answer of the British Cabinet was given, the Government of France had ceased to be vested in the hands of the King. It is true, that he was not *formally* deposed till a month after the period in question: but nearly three weeks had elapsed after the celebrated 20th of June; and from this day the whole power of France, executive as well as legislative, was lodged in the National Assembly. Consequently, it was the business of the British Cabinet, in all matters relative to the political situation of the two countries, to regulate its conduct by the views and motives of this Assembly. The question therefore is, Did the National Assembly, or at least a majority of its members, at the time of the proposed mediation,

mediation, sincerely wish the re-establishment of peace? Or did they not, on the contrary, ardently wish for a continuance of the war? This question shall be minutely examined.

It was hardly two months before Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 18th of June was presented to the British Government, that the National Assembly had decreed the war against the King of Hungary, with an unanimity and an enthusiasm which clearly proved, that, in the opinion of almost all its members war was more advantageous to them than peace. (6) Even so early as the

(6) See the debates in the *Moniteur*, 22d April, 1792. In vain said Mr. Becquet, one of the seven members, who alone out of the seven hundred and fifty voted against the war, "*Renonçons à une entreprise qui n'a aucun objet réel; bornons-nous à nous défendre, si quelque puissance nous attaque, et probablement nous n'aurons pas de guerre.*" for this speech excited in the Assembly a violent tumult.

29th of December, 1791, Brissot had declared in the National Assembly, that "war was a real benefit to the nation, and that the only evil which they had to dread was the not having war:" (7) and a few days after Isard explained to the Assembly, in what *respect* a war was to be considered as a national benefit, namely, as being the means of completing the revolution. (8) The completion of the revolution, therefore, or, in

(7) "La guerre est actuellement un bienfait national, et la seule calamité qu'il y ait à redouter, c'est de n'avoir pas la guerre." *Moniteur*, 31st December, 1791. Even two months before, in a debate of the 20th of October 1791, Brissot had said: "Il ne faut pas seulement vous défendre, *il faut attaquer vous-même.*" See Lally Tolendal, *Défense des Emigrés Français*, tom. i. p. 189.

(8) "Une guerre est prête à s'allumer, *guerre indispensable pour consommer la révolution.*" *Moniteur*, 6th Jan. 1792. On the 4th of January, the same orator had already said: "Que tous les Français accourent au Club des Jacobins; voici le moment où nous allons publier la guerre." See Lally Tolendal, *Défense des Emigrés Français*, tom. i. p. 198.

other words, the deposition of the King and the establishment of a republic, was to be effected by a foreign war, which should divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations on the borders. That this was the real object of the war which was declared against Austria, the chiefs of the revolution avowed openly, as soon as their object was attained. For on the very day after the National Convention had decreed the abolition of royalty in France, (9) Brissot boasted in his celebrated journal, that “without the war the revolution of the 10th of August would not have taken place; that without the war, France would not have become a republic:” (10)

(9) This decree, which was the first act of the National Convention, passed on the 21st of September, 1792. See the *Moniteur*, 22d September, 1792.

(10) “Sans la guerre la révolution du 10 Août n’aurait pas eu lieu: sans la guerre la France ne serait pas république.” *Journal du Patriote Français*, 22d Sept. 1792.

and a few weeks afterwards he declared, in the most positive and unequivocal terms, that "it was the abolition of royalty which he had in view, when he provoked the declaration of war." (11) Louvet also, in his address to Robespierre, said, "We wished for war, we genuine Jacobins, because peace was certainly destructive to the republic:" (12) and a few lines afterwards he added, "Republicans, who were worthy of the name, demanded the war, they dared aspire to the lasting renown, to the immortal honour, of abolishing royalty itself, of abolishing it for ever, at

(11) "C'était l'abolition de la royauté, que j'avais en vue, en faisant déclarer la guerre." Brissot à tous les républicains de France sur les Jacobins, (Paris, Oct. 1792) p. 8.

(12) "Nous voulions la guerre, nous purs Jacobins, parcequ'à coup sûr la paix tuait la république." L. B. Louvet à Maximilien Robespierre et à ses royalistes (Dec. 1792), p. 18.

“ first in France, and then throughout the
 “ world.” (13)

The object, therefore, of the National Assembly in involving France in a war, lies open to public view : and in order to attain this favourite object, the principal members of it had such a thirst after hostilities, and so frequently expressed it in their public speeches and writings, that if any man should take the pains to collect the scattered

(13) “ Ils appellaient la guerre les républicains
 “ dignes de l'être : ils osaient aspirer à la gloire solide,
 “ à l'immortel honneur de *tuer la royauté même, de la*
 “ *tuer à jamais, d'abord en France, et puis dans l'uni-*
 “ *vers.*” Ib. Likewise Collot d'Herbois said : “ Nous
 “ avons voulu la guerre, parceque la guerre devait
 “ tuer la royauté.” See Lally Tolendal Défense, etc.
 tom. i. p. 208. And Cambon, after the war had be-
 gun to take a favourable turn, made the following de-
 claration, in the name of the three united committees
 of War, Finance and Diplomacy : “ Ils se sont de-
 “ mandé d'abord quel est l'objet de la guerre que vous
 “ avez entreprise ? C'est sans doute l'*anéantissement*
 “ *de tous les privilèges.*” Moniteur, 18th Dec. 1792.
 expressions

expressions on this subject, from the *Moniteur* and other political publications, he might fill with them a complete volume. Campon even declared, that "it was necessary to break with *all* the courts:" (14) and Brissot himself acknowledges, that the resolution was formed "to set all Europe at defiance." (15) Lastly, as soon as the plan, which had been long in agitation, approached to its maturity, this same Brissot went so far as to assert, "We must set fire to the four corners of Europe, for there lies our salvation." (16)

(14) "Il faut rompre avec *tous* les cabinets." These words of Campon are quoted by Brissot in his work *à ses Commettans* (Paris 1793), p. 74.

(15) "Voilà les grands idées, qu'il fallait concevoir, qu'il fallait exécuter, puisque l'on *voulait braver toute l'Europe.*" *Ib.* p. 73.

(16) "Il faut incendier les quatre coins de l'Europe: notre salut est là." These words are quoted from one of Brissot's letters by Mallet du Pan, in his

This salvation was first fought in a war with Austria: and in order to effect it, the first step taken by the National Assembly was the removal of Deleffart, Narbonne, Bertrand de Molleville, with the other French Cabinet Ministers, who, as well as the King himself, were desirous of preserving peace, and the appointment of a new Ministry, which consisted entirely of Jacobins, and, agreeably to the wishes of the National Assembly, obliged the King to propose a declaration of war. (17) It cannot be here objected, that the members of the National Assembly demanded a declaration of war *merely* because they themselves were apprehensive of a similar declaration on the part

Considérations sur la Nature de la Révolution Française, (Londres, 1793) p. 37.

(17) "Le Ministère fut alors complètement composé de Jacobins, qui sous la protection du côté gauche de l'Assemblée demandaient à grand cris une déclaration de guerre." Bertrand de Molleville *Mémoires Secrets*, tom. ii. p. 143.

of Austria, and that they had *no other object* in view than to secure to themselves the advantages arising from the first attack; for their own confessions prove the contrary. Nor is it by any means so probable, as is commonly supposed, that the Austrian Cabinet would have declared war against France, even if the National Assembly had not declared war against Austria. It is true, that in the year 1791 a coalition had been formed against France: but in April, 1792, when France declared war against Austria, the coalition, which even in 1791 had produced no effect, appeared to have been abandoned. The King of Sweden, one of the chief instigators to a war with France, was already murdered; (18) and after his death the state of politics in Sweden took a totally new turn. The Emperor Leopold was

(18) It was on the 18th of March, 1792, that the King of Sweden was mortally wounded by the murderer Ankerström.

likewise dead; (19) and his successor Francis II. gave no indications of a warlike disposition. (20) The character of Leopold was likewise pacific; and there is reason to believe that it was not his design to commence hostilities against France, but merely to alarm the Jacobins by a junction of several powers, and to deter them from offering violence to the persons of his brother-in-law and his own sister, whose fate he could not regard with indifference. (21) That it

(19) The Emperor Leopold died on the 1st of March, 1792, and almost as suddenly as the King of Sweden.

(20) Even a month before the declaration of war, Dumouriez, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to the French Ambassador at Vienna, dated 18th March, 1792, in which he said: "Les affaires doivent prendre, par la mort de Léopold, une nouvelle marche." His letter is printed in the *Moniteur*, 18th April, 1792.

(21) In a note to the French Ambassador at Vienna, which is printed in the *Moniteur*, 24th Dec. 1791, he expressed

was the wish neither of Leopold, nor of his Ministers, to engage in a war with France, is attested by the Marquis de Bouillé, who was well acquainted with the sentiments of the Austrian Cabinet. (22) And if the

expressed himself as follows: “ On ne peut plus douter
 “ de ma façon de penser sur les affaires de la France.
 “ Ma dernière déclaration, et les ordres que j’ai fait
 “ donner par mon Gouverneur à Bruxelles, l’agent des
 “ émigrés Français, prouvent que je regarde mon beau
 “ frère comme libre, et que mon intention n’est pas
 “ de me mêler des affaires de son royaume, aussi long-
 “ tems que les Français lui laisseront tout ce qu’ils lui
 “ ont assuré volontairement, et ce qu’il a volontaire-
 “ ment accepté dans le nouveau contrat constitu-
 “ tionnel.”

(22) In his *Mémoires sur la Révolution Française*, tom. ii. p. 136, where he speaks of his arrival in Prague, at the coronation of the Emperor, he says: “ J’y arrivai au commencement de Septembre, et j’y
 “ restai huit ou dix jours sans recevoir le moindre ordre
 “ de l’Empereur. J’y appris, de manière à n’en pouvoir
 “ plus douter, que les dispositions du Cabinet de Vienne
 “ n’étaient point du tout à la guerre; et je dois au Ma-
 “ réchal de Lasci la justice de déclarer, qu’il m’a plu-
 “ sieurs fois répété, que les ressources de la France
 “ étaient

150
testimony of a friend of Louis XVI. be thought insufficient, we may produce the confession of the opposite party. On the 20th of October, 1791, nearly two months after the conference at Pillnitz, Brissot declared to the National Assembly, "I can assure you, that there is no reason to be alarmed at the conduct of the Court of

"étaient immenses, ses frontières impénétrables, et
"qu'il ne presserait jamais la déclaration d'une guerre,
"qui dans son opinion pourrait avoir les suites les plus
"désastreuses pour l'Empereur et pour l'empire. Telle
"était aussi, je l'avouerai, l'avis de tous les Ministres
"impériaux. Léopold espérait toujours terminer les
"affaires de France par une négociation." This moderate conduct of the Emperor was so much the more commendable, as the King of Prussia was decidedly in favour of war: for M. de Bouillé, in relating the conference at Pillnitz (Mémoires, tom. ii. p. 134) says: "Les vues de l'Empereur étaient pacifiques. Le
"Roi de Prusse au contraire voulait absolument la
"guerre. Plusieurs circonstances de cette entrevue ne
"me permettent pas de douter des dispositions dont
"ces deux Souverains étaient animés. Elles m'ont
"d'ailleurs été confirmées par des personnes qui jouis-
"saient de leur confiance."

Austria.

Austria. Its sovereign loves peace, and w
“ for peace.—All circumstances unite to
“ duce Leopold to abstain from displa
“ the force of arms.”(23) On the 29
December, 1791, Brissot said again, “
“ wavering measures of the Cabinet of
“ enna afford us no reason to appreh
“ war on the part of the Emperor.
“ Prince, he wishes for peace, as hea
“ the German empire he gives himself
“ air of wishing for war.”(24) And this
fession was so much the more remark
as it was delivered in the very same spe

(23) “ Je dois vous rassurer sur la conduite
“ Cour Autrichienne. Son chef aime la paix, v
“ paix.—Tout fait à Léopold la loi, de ne poin
“ ployer la force des armes.” *Moniteur*, 22d
ber, 1791.

(24) “ Les oscillations du Cabinet de Vienne
“ doivent pas nous faire redouter la guerre de la
“ de l'Empereur. Comme Prince il veut la
“ comme chef de l'empire Germanique il a l'
“ vouloir la guerre.” *Moniteur*, 30th Dec. 17

in which Brissot recommended war,^o as a national benefit to France. (25) From the 29th of December, 1791, when the pacific designs of Leopold were acknowledged in the National Assembly, till the time of his death, no circumstances occurred, which could excite a suspicion of his having changed his political system. On the contrary, all his measures evinced a determined resolution to avoid hostilities with France. At the request of the French Government, all military exercise and the assembling of troops was strictly forbidden to the emigrants on the borders of Germany: (26) and so con-

(25) See Note 7.

(26) By desire of the Emperor, the Elector of Treves issued an edict (printed in the *Moniteur*, 10th Jan. 1792), in which he engaged to fulfil the following articles:

1. De faire quitter l'Electorat dans huit jours d'ici, ou disperser tous ceux qui portent la denomination d'un corps militaire.

2. Toute espece d'exercice militaire sera defendu iterativement, et ceux qui agiront contre l'ordonnance
seront

CH. VII.] *of Great Britain and France.*

ciliatory was Leopold in his conduct toward the National Assembly, that when the Prince of Condé, with about eleven hundred emi-

feront tenus de quitter l'Electorat dans trois jours ; et à cette fin on dénoncera les logemens.

3. Tous les recruteurs étrangers, à l'exception de ceux de sa Majesté l'Empereur seront arrêtés et condamnés, suivant une ordonnance émanée depuis mois, à la forteresse, et aux travaux publics deux ans.

In the other articles, it was strictly forbidden to furnish the emigrants with ammunition, arms, or any thing which could assist their military operations. And with regard to the Elector of Mayence, the French Minister informed that Court, gave the following testimony to his own Government, printed in the *Moniteur*, Feb. 1792: "Que ni dans l'archevêché de Mayence, ni dans l'évêché de Worms, il ne s'était fait aucun semblemens militaires." Further the Emperor himself, in his letter to the Elector of Treves (printed in the *Moniteur*, 24th Jan. 1792) said, "He had given orders, that in case, and in that case only, (dans le cas déterminé, et dans aucun autre, as expressed in the *Moniteur*) that he should be attacked by the French without having given provocation by permitting the emigrants to arm and assemble on his territories."

...ant, after having been ordered on the 2d of January, 1792, to depart from Worms, retreated to Ettenheim, he gave further orders to the Prince to depart likewise from that place. (27) In the Austrian Netherlands the number of troops did not exceed the usual peace establishment: and neither magazines were formed, nor any other measures taken, which indicated a preparation

... (sans que nous y eussions donné lieu en ou en tolérant des attroupemens ou des guerre de la part des Français émigrés) ... should be sent into the electorate."

... which clearly evinced the resolution of ... to act only on the defensive, was, with the artifice, on the 20th of April, 1792, the ... which war was declared, converted into an act ... y, by omitting all the words, which I have ... in parentheses, and thus metamorphosed was, ... want of better reasons, alleged as one of the ... ves to a war with Austria. See the *Moniteur*, ... April, 1791.

(27) Lally Tollendal *Défense des Emigrés*, tom. i. p. 196.

for war. (28) Yet at this very time, France itself made the most vigorous military exertions: for it appears by the official report of the War Minister to the National Assembly on the 12th of Jan. 1792, that there were already assembled on the borders, from Dunkirk to Besançon, two hundred and forty battalions, an hundred and sixty squadrons, and artillery sufficient for an army of two hundred thousand men. The War Minister further reported, that magazines, sufficient to supply two hundred and thirty thousand men, and twenty-two thousand horses, for six months, were already prepared, and that the most active measures were then taking for a further augmentation of them. (29)

(28) It is a well-known fact, that, when the French army invaded the Netherlands soon after the declaration of war against Austria, General Beaulieu was so little prepared for their reception, that he was obliged to order post horses to expedite the transport of artillery.

(29) “ Depuis Dunquerque jusqu’à Besançon l’armée présente une masse de 240 bataillons, et 20000 chevaux.”

This extraordinary armament, and these vigorous preparations, could not have merely the French emigrants for their object, or be designed merely to protect the frontiers from an invasion on their part; for even if the emigrants had been permitted to form themselves into a military corps, which they really were not, still the whole number of those who had attached themselves, as well to the brothers of the King, as to the Prince of Condé, did not *at that time* exceed four thousand seven hundred. (30) Nor could the

“ escadrons avec l’artillerie nécessaire pour 200 mille
 “ hommes. Les magasins, tant en vivres qu’en four-
 “ rage, assurent la subsistance de 230 mille hommes,
 “ et 22 mille chevaux, pendant six mois. On travaille
 “ à la plus grande activité à les augmenter encore.”
 Moniteur, 14th Jan. 1792.

(30) I ally Tollendal Défense des Emigrés, tom. i. p. 196, 197. It is true that at the latter end of July, when the Duke of Brunswick was at Coblenz, their number was thrice as great: but more than three months had then elapsed after the declaration of war.

armament

armament have been a mere *défensive* measure against the Emperor, since Brissot himself had acknowledged, only fourteen days before the War Minister made his report to the National Assembly, that the designs of Leopold were pacific. It was evidently, therefore, the intention of the National Assembly to act on the offensive, which actual experience soon afterwards confirmed. (21)

(31) I shall not investigate any farther the origin of the war between France and Austria, because the present history is confined to the relations between France and Great Britain. Whoever wishes to examine the subject more fully, may consult the correspondence between the Courts of France and Austria, from Jan. 15th to April 7th, 1792, printed in Rivington's Annual Register, 1792, State Papers, p. 212—242: the counter declaration of the Austrian Court of the 4th of July, compared with the report delivered to the National Assembly on the 20th of April; Lally Tollendal, *Défense des Emigrés Français*, tom. i. p. 189—209; and the *Collection des meilleurs ouvrages qui ont été publiés pour la défense de Louis XVI.* tom. i. p. 307—313, 335—388. In this last place is printed a remarkable letter, written to Neckar on the 8th of

But suppose, for the sake of argument, that Austria would have attacked France, if France had not attacked Austria, it will still remain an undeniable fact, that the National Assembly, or at least a great majority of its members, were as desirous of war as any Sovereign in Europe could be. The testimonies of its leading members, which

July, 1792, by Delessart, late Minister for Foreign Affairs. from his prison at Orleans, in which he says :

“ Je commence à croire, que toutes les difficultés possible sont épuisées ; la communication des pièces qui m'étaient nécessaires va bientôt me mettre en état de travailler à ma défense. Mais je regretterai toute ma vie, qu'elle n'a pu paraître dans le moment actuelle ; car elle sera curieuse, non pas pour ce qui sera de moi, mais par la manifestation de ce qui s'est passé dans les cours étrangères ; par la démonstration qu'on ne voulait point nous faire la guerre ; par la preuve sans réplique, que c'est nous, qui l'avons provoquée, qui l'avons commencée, qui avons mis l'Europe contre nous.” This testimony is so much the

more credible, as Delessart could have no view of deriving any advantage from it, since it was delivered in a private letter, to a man in a private station, and then resident out of France.

have

have been already quoted, remove the question beyond all doubt. The same testimonies further prove, that the grand object of the National Assembly, in declaring war against Austria, was to effect the deposition of the King, and the abolition of royalty in France. (32) But this grand object was not

(32) A secondary motive was the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands, where they had already a considerable party. It is true, that on the very day on which war was declared against Austria, they made the most positive declaration, "de n'entreprendre aucune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquêtes." *Moniteur*, 22d April, 1792. But at present we all know by experience, what construction is to be put on French declarations. Mr. Becquet, however, said very candidly, on the day on which war was declared: "Elle (l'Autriche) n'a pris, depuis que les négociations sont entamées, que des mesures défensives; trois armées formidables bordaient vos frontières; elle n'y a opposé qu'un nombre de troupes très-inférieur. Vous le savez, et sans doute vous ne voulez l'attaquer en ce moment, que parceque vous êtes certains d'être plus préparés qu'elle dans vos mesures." *Moniteur*, 22 Avril, 1792.

yet attained, when the mediation of Great Britain was requested: for Mr. Chauvelin's note was dated the 18th of June, and the King of France was not dethroned before the 10th of August. Consequently, had it been in the power of the British Cabinet to have instantly produced a general peace, the National Assembly would in all probability have declared war a second time: for if a general peace had taken place in June, 1792, and that peace had continued, the King of France would have preserved both his life and his crown. But it is evident that the leaders of the National Assembly were resolved to run all hazards, rather than not attain their favourite object. The danger from without gave them very little concern, provided they could continue, without interruption, their intrigues in the interior: and for this reason the march of the Russian army made no alteration in the sentiments which they entertained, when they declared

war

war against Austria. They knew, likewise, beforehand, that a declaration of war against Austria included a declaration of war against Prussia; for, these two powers had, in February, 1792, concluded a defensive treaty, by which it was stipulated, that in case either of the contracting parties should be attacked, the other party should immediately send a succour of fifteen thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry; and, if these should be deemed insufficient, augment their number according to the nature of the circumstances. (33) All this was

(33) The genuine treaty, concluded between Austria and Prussia, in Feb. 1792, is printed in Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. v. p. 77—81, and is merely defensive, not offensive, as some writers have asserted. The preliminaries are dated 7th of February, the ratification 19th of February: and this date proves the spuriousness of the pretended offensive treaty, which bears date the 12th of February, and is printed in the *Moniteur*, 13th April, 1792. Even the editor of the *Moniteur* did not venture to assert its authenticity, for he called it only “une pièce qui

known to the members of the National Assembly, before they decreed war against Austria: it cannot, therefore, be said, that they were threatened in the month of June with a danger, which they did not apprehend in the month of April. And that during this interval they had not changed their sentiments, is evident from all their speeches: for whoever consults the *Moni-*

“parait authentique.” And the National Assembly was fully persuaded of its spuriousness, as appears from the circumstance, that a whole week had elapsed after its appearance in the *Moniteur*, when the war against Austria was decreed, and yet it was not mentioned among the motives which were alledged in justification of the war, though the offensive treaty, had it really existed, would have been the best vindication which the National Assembly could have produced. It must be referred, therefore, to the class of fabrications which the French rulers and their advocates have propagated with great industry and success: and we may safely conclude, that it was inserted in the *Moniteur* a week before the intended Declaration of war, in order to prepare men's minds for the event.

teur,

teur, from the declaration of war against Austria to the proposal of a mediation, will find, that not a single expression escaped the leaders of the Assembly, which indicated a disposition to peace. The augmentation of the force with which they had to contend, diminished not in the least their ardour for hostilities: on the contrary, as Brissot himself said, “ vast ideas, grand designs, and an “ object sublime and difficult, were necessary to form men, and a great nation.” (34) It was, in fact, their *own* desire “ to break “ with *all* the courts:” it was their own resolution, “ to set all Europe at defiance:” it was their own determination “ to set the “ four corners of Europe on fire.” (35)

(34) “ Pour former des hommes, une grande nation, il faut de vastes idées, de grands objets, un “ but sublime et difficile.” Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 76.

(35) See the 14th, 15th and 16th notes to this chapter.

These are the men for whom Great Britain was requested to procure the blessings of *peace*: these are the men, for whose sakes the British Government has been so severely reprehended for not attempting to confer a favour which the former were as unwilling to accept, (36) as the latter was unable to bestow. The advocates, therefore, of the

(36) Beside the motives already alledged, another reason would have induced the National Assembly, in the summer of 1792, to reject all offers of peace, namely, fear for their own personal safety. For Roland, the French Minister of the Interior, said at that time to a friend of Mr. Miles in France: "Peace is out of the question: we have 300,000 men in arms; we must make them march as far as their legs will carry them, or they will return and cut our throats." See the Authentic Correspondence with Mr. Le Brun the French Minister, and others, to February, 1793, inclusive. London, 1796-8, p. 144, 2d. edition. The same reason, independent of schemes of ambition, prevents, likewise, the Directory from making a general peace: for the moment the French armies cease to be occupied with the plunder of foreign countries, they will demand, with arms in their hands, the promised thousand millions, and, as it will be impossible
to

French, who represent them as "solicitous for peace," defend them on grounds which were openly and avowedly discarded by their clients themselves: and if Mr. Chauvelin's note of the 18th of June, be regarded as a request from the National Assembly, it will become a proof of the blackest hypocrisy.—Consequently, in whatever light we view the answer of the British Cabinet of the 8th of July, it is in every respect unexceptionable.

to pay them, will overturn the present Government. Unhappy Constitution, which requires for its support the wretchedness of all Europe!

CHAP. VIII.

Sensation produced in France by the sailing of five Ships of the Line and a few Frigates, from Portsmouth, to perform naval Evolutions in the Channel. Proposal made in the National Assembly of an immediate Armament of thirty Ships of the Line. Chauvelin's Letter to his own Government, containing positive Assurances, that the British Cabinet had no Views of Hostility. Resolution of the National Assembly, that Chauvelin's Letter was satisfactory, and that a naval Armament was unnecessary.

ON the 11th of July, 1792, a small fleet sailed from Portsmouth, under the command of Admiral Lord Hood to perform naval evolutions in the channel.

The

The whole fleet consisted only of five ships of the line, beside frigates and sloops: it had only a fortnight's provision on board, and had manifestly no other destination, than a sea-review, (1) which, being nothing new in England, ought no more to have excited alarm, than a land-review at Potsdam or Berlin. The matter, however, was so magnified in France, and was represented in so false a light, that on the 26th of July, an immediate armament of thirty ships of the line was proposed in the National Assembly, and the Marine Committee was ordered to draw up a report on the subject, and present it within a few days. (2)

In the mean time, the following letter from Mr. Chauvelin to Mr. Chambonas,

(1) All these circumstances are confirmed by Chauvelin's letter.

(2) See the *Moniteur*, 28th July, 1792.

dated London, 17th July, 1792, was published : (3)

“ You may have seen, Sir, from the public papers of this country, that a fleet,

(3) It was printed in the *Moniteur*, 29th July, 1792, and in the original is as follows :

“ Londres, le 17 Juillet, 1792.

“ Monsieur, vous avez pu voir, dans les papiers
 “ publics de ce pays-ci, que depuis assez long-tems il
 “ a été question de l’escadre qui vient de sortir du port
 “ de Portsmouth. D’après tous les renseignements,
 “ que je me suis empressé de prendre dès le premier
 “ moment que j’en ai eu connaissance, j’ai partagé à
 “ ce sujet, et je partage encore la sécurité de tous les
 “ Anglais même les plus jaloux des opérations du Gouvernement. Tous ont pensé et pensent encore, que
 “ cet armement n’a d’autre objet que de faire faire
 “ quelques évolutions aux matelots Anglais, et de préparer pour la Famille Royale, pour ce mois prochain,
 “ le spectacle d’une revue, qu’on peut regarder comme le pendant de celle du camp de Bagshot. Aussi,
 “ Monsieur, le silence que j’ai gardé à cet égard, aura-t-il sans doute été pour vous une preuve du peu
 “ d’importance qu’on doit attacher à cet armement,
 “ et je n’aurais pas rompu ce silence sans les armes
 “ que m’ont témoignées quelques Français, qui re-
 “ comment

“ which has lately sailed from Portsmouth,
 “ has been for some time the topic of con-
 “ versation. From all the information which
 “ I have endeavoured to procure, from the
 “ moment I had knowledge of it, I have par-
 “ taken, and still partake, on this subject, of
 “ the security of the English, even of those
 “ who are the most jealous of the opera-
 “ tions of Government. They have all been,

“ comment arrivés du Continent paraissent avoir con-
 “ servé certaines fausses idées sur les dispositions du Gou-
 “ vernement Anglais. Ce n'est donc que pour rassurer
 “ ceux qui en France pourraient penser comme eux,
 “ d'autant plus que dans de pareils cas les objets vus
 “ de loin grossissent plutôt qu'ils ne diminuent, que
 “ je me suis déterminé de vous rendre compte, Mon-
 “ sieur, de cet armement dont je vous envoie la liste,
 “ et à vous assurer, que toutes les données que j'ai pu
 “ recueillir se réunissent à me convaincre, qu'il n'est
 “ en aucune manière relatif aux affaires, soit de la
 “ France en particulier, soit du Continent en général.

“ Le Ministre Plénipotentiaire de France.

“ Signé, CHAUVELIN.

“ Liste des vaisseaux partis le 11 juillet au matin du

“ and are still of opinion, that the arma-
 “ ment has no other object, than to exercise
 “ the English sailors in certain evolutions,
 “ and to prepare for the Royal Family, in the
 “ following month, the spectacle of a sea-
 “ review, which may be considered as the
 “ counterpart of the camp at Bagshot. The
 “ silence, therefore, which I have observed,
 “ Sir, on this subject, must prove to you
 “ my conviction, that the armament is of

“ port de Portsmouth, pour croiser dans la Manche,
 “ sous le commandement de Lord Hood.

“ Vaisseaux Canons.

1. ^{re}	Le Duc	-	90
2.	L'Alfred	- -	74 ^e
3.	Le Brunswick		74
4.	L'Orion	-	74 ^e
5.	L'Annibal	e	74 ^e

“ Frégattes

6.	L'Iphigénie	-	32 ^e
----	-------------	---	-----------------

etc.

etc.

etc.

“ En commission dans le port de Plymouth : 1 vais-
 “ seau de 74, 1 de 24, 2 cutters de 16, 1 yacht de 10.

“ L'escadre n'a des vivres à son bord que pour quinze
 “ jours.”

“ no

“ no importance : and I should not have
 “ broken silence even now, without the
 “ alarms signified to me by some French-
 “ men lately arrived from the Continent,
 “ who seem still to entertain *certain false*
 “ *notions on the dispositions of the English Go-*
 “ *vernment.* With a view, therefore, of re-
 “ moving the apprehensions of those who
 “ may be of the same opinion in France, es-
 “ pecially as in similar cases objects seen at
 “ a distance are magnified rather than dimi-
 “ nished, I have determined, Sir, to give
 “ you an account of the armament, of which
 “ I send you a list, and to assure you, that
 “ all the intelligence which I have been
 “ able to collect, unites in convincing me,
 “ that the armament has no relation what-
 “ soever either to France in particular, or to
 “ the Continent in general.”

The Minister Plenipotentiary of France.

Signed, CHAUVELIN.

On the 4th of August, the day on which the Marine Committee had been ordered to make its report, Mr. Forfait, the chairman of the Committee, read Mr. Chauvelin's letter before the National Assembly: and it was considered as so satisfactory, in regard to the sentiments of the British Cabinet, that the proposed armament was declared unnecessary. (4) We have the testimony, therefore, of the National Assembly itself, that the British Cabinet, as far as August, 1792, had no hostile views toward France.

(4) See *Moniteur*, 6th August, 1792.